Introduction
The Constitutional Court subscribes to a standard of "deference" in judicial review. 1 The principle of deference concerns the function of the judge in mediating between the law and legislative and executive politics. The principle recognises the need to protect the institutional character of each of the three arms of government in a manner that will prevent their ability to discharge their constitutional role being undermined. 2 O'Regan frames this vision as follows: 3
The role of the courts under our Constitution is to protect the Constitution, and in particular individual fundamental rights. At times, in asserting this function, courts will have to intrude to some extent on the terrain of the legislature and the executive. In doing so, however, it is clear from the jurisprudence that is emerging that courts must remain sensitive to the legitimate constitutional interests of the other arms of government and seek to ensure that the manner of their intrusion, while protecting fundamental rights, intrudes as little as possible in the terrain of the executive and the legislature.
This defence of the theory of judicial interpretation employed seems to encourage judges to limit the exercise of their own power, and go to great lengths to defer to the legislature and the executive. Therefore, the theory of judicial deference, as employed by the courts, increasingly sounds like judicial restraint. Is this theory of judicial review employed by the courts suitable for the current politico-legal landscape of the South African constitutional state? Pieterse argues: 4 Given the executive's stranglehold over the legislature, citizens increasingly look to the judiciary to ensure accountability and for the protection of their basic interest. Today, the judiciary acts both as watchdog over the other branches' adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers and as primary protector of citizens' rights within its confines. In South Africa, as elsewhere, this reality has been underscored by the and balances elsewhere, courts should respond, not by adopting a deferential position, but by ensuring that the other branches of government are held accountable to it and the Constitution. 9 This work investigates the theory of judicial review employed by the courts against the context of the public litigation where it is utilised.
Section 2 of this work investigates the concept, characteristics and benefits of public litigation. Around the world, litigation or judicial review has become immensely popular as a treatment for the pains of modern governance. 10 South Africa is no exception to this phenomenon. 11 This activism by litigation consists of efforts to promote, impede, or direct social, political, economic, or environmental change, or stasis. 12 The question is asked; can the concept of public litigation offer assistance in shaping and influencing the theory of judicial review employed by the courts?
In Section 3 the application of the theory of deference as employed by the courts is discussed. The Constitution opted for a model of the relationship between the legislature and executive modelled more closely on the Westminster system than on the presidential system found in France and the United States. 13 Unfortunately, this weakens the ability of Parliament to function as an effective check on the abuse of power by the executive. It is argued that, given the fusion between the executive and the legislature in South Africa 14 and the overconcentration of executive power in the legislature, 15 the concept of deference in judicial review falls short of finding the correct balance between the constitutional values of participation, openness, justification and accountability.
Section 4 of the work explores the culture of justification articulated by Davis as a coherent theory of judicial review set against the backdrop of public litigation. 9 McLean Constitutional Deference 209. 10 Hertogh & Halliday Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future research 15. 11 Hoexter Administrative Law 104. 12 Schokman, Creasey and Mohen Short Guide 3. 13 O'Regan 2005 PER/PELJ 125. 14 Labuschagne 2011 Politeia 2; Choudhry 2009 CCR 11; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001 Democratization 44-45.
Public litigation
Scholars have disagreed about the defining features of public litigation, a term often used to refer to the diverse proceedings of modern, non-traditional litigation. 16 The term public litigation is used in this work to refer to lawsuits challenging legislative or executive action, seeking policy changes within government, and seeking to restructure the organisation of public institutions or expose corruption. A focal point for public litigation in this sense is that the legislator or the executive will always be a party to the proceedings. Although public litigation is typically brought following specific violations of constitutional rights, values or obligations, the aim is not redress for past damages. Contrary to the traditional plaintiffs of the South African common law, litigants use public litigation to rectify constitutional violations not easily definable in terms of personal, financial loss or other damages claimable at common law. Public litigation therefore allows for participation in the political decision-making process for individuals, minorities and groups that are politically marginalised.
Although the motives for the litigation vary, litigants may seek to reform the institutional structure from which constitutional violations arose and from which similar wrongs may arise again. In this sense, public litigation, or activism by litigation, presents a new means of policymaking not found in any civics books. 17 Activists are then able, through the legal process, and by using the courts, to influence government decisions and advance their own interests. Organisations and individuals often disregard or distrust the political process and approach the courts to advance their own interest and to protect their own rights, 18 or to correct constitutional violations where political means have failed.
Schokman states that the organisation or individual takes on a legal case as part of a strategy to achieve broader systemic change. The case may create change either 16 Traditional litigation refers to the common law principles of litigation as defined in Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 229. Litigation is instituted to claim for damages, to correct a wrong or to obtain relief from another. The traditional cause of action featured a plaintiff with clear and identifiable rights and the defendant with clear obligations or liabilities. In terms of the common law, the litigants would pray for a remedy that would usually involve monetary compensation, and the effect of the remedy would rarely reach beyond the parties to the case. She stated that in litigation of a public character the relief sought is generally forwardlooking and general in its application, so that it may directly affect a wide range of people. In addition, the harm alleged may often be quite diffuse or amorphous.
Because the alleged harm is often nondescript, the motive behind public litigation is often difficult to determine. This allows for the misuse of the court process by individuals, groups, political parties and the state. Litigants abusing the court process are able to frustrate or delay legitimate administrative action or attempt to gain political mileage from the litigation.
In Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, 23 the Court held as follows: 24
The principle of legality implies that public bodies must be kept within their powers. There should, in general, be no reason why individual harm should be required in addition to the public interest of the general community. Public law litigation may also differ from traditional litigation between individuals in a number of respects. A wide range of persons may be affected by the case. The emphasis will often not only be backward looking, in the sense of redressing past wrongs, but also forward- looking, to ensure that the future exercise of public power is in accordance with the principle of legality.
The fact that a wide range of individuals may be affected by the outcome of the case is problematic. People may be affected without any input in the case. Therefore, because a wide range of people are affected by the litigation and the possibility of abuse of the process exists, an expansive theory of judicial review is called for. This expansive theory should be based on the founding provisions of the Constitution. 25 This allows the court to query whether an order made by the court will achieve or advance the values of human dignity, equality, human rights, the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law and the democracy of government, including accountability, responsiveness and openness.
The function of the judge in public litigation may also differ from his or her position in private litigation. In private litigation the judge will usually not be involved in the case after granting of the order. In public litigation the judge may stay involved in the proceedings after the final order is granted. Although South African courts were initially reluctant to grant supervisory orders or structural interdicts, 26 the courts have more recently granted supervisory orders in several cases. 27 In public litigation the judge is active, with the responsibility not only for credible fact assessment but also for organising and shaping the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome. 28 The fact that the judge is active in shaping the litigation and stays involved after ruling on the matter rules out a formalistic approach to constitutional interpretation. Public litigation then is a space of possibility, with the protection and advancement of the In public law litigation, then, fact-finding is principally concerned with "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" fact. In addition, "fact evaluation" is perhaps a more accurate term than "fact finding." The whole process begins to look like the traditional description of legislation: Attention is drawn to a "mischief," existing or threatened, and the activity of the parties and court is directed to the development of on-going measures designed to cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is often the case, the decree sets up an affirmative regime governing the activities in controversy for the indefinite future and having binding force for persons within its ambit, then it is not very much of a stretch to see it as, pro tanto, a legislative act. In Glenister v President of the RSA, 36 the Court found:
Public litigation in
In our constitutional democracy, the courts are the ultimate guardians of the Constitution. They not only have the right to intervene in order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, they also have the duty to do so. It is in the performance of this that courts are more likely to confront the question of whether to venture into the domain of other branches of government and the extent of such intervention. But even in these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their power.
Therefore, although the courts have the duty to intervene in constitutional violations, they have the discretion to decide when and to what extent to intervene when such a violation occurs within the domain of other branches of government. The decision on when to intervene and then to what extent will depend on the standard of judicial review to which the courts subscribe. It is imperative for legal certainty that litigators 35 This is in contrast with the extensive original jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court in terms of a 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950. 36 Glenister v President of the RSA 2009 1 SA 287 (CC) para 30. and activists are aware of when the court will intervene within the sphere of other state institutions and when the court will defer to such institutions.
Chayes writes that, unlike an administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved. 37 Can the courts avoid this duty by electing not to intervene in a constitutional violation as it occurred within the sphere of another state organ? The discretion implied in the deference doctrine certainly suggests so. It is submitted that the legal uncertainty inherent in the deference doctrine is bad in law and can be avoided by subscribing to a more expansive theory of judicial review.
Determination of the "proper standard" for judicial review
The principle of judicial review is well established in the South African constitutional state. The Constitution clearly mandates the courts to review legislation or conduct that is inconsistent with constitutional provisions. 38 Although there should be a culture of mutual co-operation and respect between the different branches of government, 39 the courts are mandated by constitutional provisions to ensure that the executive and legislature operate within the boundaries of the Constitution.
In seeking to develop an appropriate response to judicial review within a constitutional dispensation, Hoexter contends that the judiciary must display: 40 A willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues; to accord their interpretations of fact and law due respect and to be sensitive in general to the interests legitimately pursued by administrative bodies and the practical and financial constraints under which they operate.
Hoexter contends that these considerations permit the adoption of a concept of deference, which is consistent with the concern for individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. She states that because of the wide powers 37 Chayes 1976 Harv L Rev 1308. 38 Section 2 of the Constitution, which states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 39 Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 40 Hoexter 2000 SALJ 501.
conferred on the courts to review executive and legislative actions, it is essential that courts justify their intervention or non-intervention. It is also important that this be done candidly and consciously rather in a formalistic or coded style. 41 In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a court should be slow to impose obligations upon government, which will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy effectively (a principle well recognised in the common law and that of other countries). As a young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot deny the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the executive to act efficiently and promptly.
The Court thus recognises the importance of allowing the executive to carry out its functions without undue hindrance. The Court reasoned as follows:
In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a court is recognising the proper role of the executive within the Constitution. In doing so, a court should be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of government. A court should thus give due weight to findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with special expertise and experience in the field.
The extent to which a court should give weight to these considerations will depend upon the character of the decision itself, as well as on the identity of the decisionmaker. A decision that requires an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or considerations and which is to be taken by a person or institution with specific expertise in that area must be shown respect by the courts. This does not mean however that where the decision is one which a will not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision. A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker.
There can be no doubt that the executive and legislative branches must be accorded The principle that policy should be implemented in a reasonable or nondiscriminatory fashion.
2
The principle that someone whose rights are affected by an official decision has a right to be heard before that decision is made.
3
The principle that, when a statute says that an official must have reason to believe that x is the case before he acts, the court should require that reasons be produced sufficient to justify that belief.
4
The principle that no executive decision can encroach on a fundamental right unless the empowering statute specifically authorises that encroachment.
5
The principle that regulations made under discretionary powers (for example, the power to make regulations declaring and dealing with a state of emergency) must be capable of being defended in a court of law by a demonstration that there are genuine circumstances of the kind which justify invoking the power and that the powers actually invoked are demonstrably related to the purpose of the empowering statute.
If the above principles are analysed, it becomes clear that he argues for a policy of non-discrimination, openness, justification, accountability and participation. A person whose rights are affected must be given an opportunity to be heard, reasons must be given for decisions, and the decisions must be based on and related to an empowering statute. 50 Mureinik 1986 SALJ 617. 51 Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 18. Davis writes that the concept of deference is employed by the courts to promote certain basic principles, namely: 54 1 South Africa is committed to transformation and to meeting the needs of the poor, hence government and its administrations are of critical importance; 2 Often, the substance of decisions made by government agencies is not appropriate to judicial decision-making, particularly because of the polycentricity of task and consequence; and 3
The government official/agency is an expert or at least more of an expert than the court deciding the issue in question. 52 Dyzenhaus 1998 SAJHR 11. 53 Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 29. If we are satisfied that the Chief Director did take into account all the factors, struck a reasonable equilibrium between them and selected reasonable means to pursue the identified legislative goal in the light of the facts before him, the applicant cannot succeed. The task of allocation of fishing quotas is a difficult one, intimately connected with complex policy decisions and requires on-going supervision and management of that process by the departmental decision-makers who are experts in the field.
Ngcobo J formulated an approach of judicial review by way of the constitutional framework within which all decisions of state organs need to be assessed. He commenced his judgment by referring to the transformative objectives of the Therefore, although Ngobo J sets a standard to which the executive must aspire; the attainment of the transformation of the fishing industry, the Court deferred to the executive on how to achieve this goal. This approach is incorrect. The Justice seems to be satisfied with the fact that the issue of transformation is addressed by the executive. Accordingly, the law can now be seen as a more or less "closed" normative system with no further input required from the Constitution. That is, with respect, a formalistic interpretation. At the heart of the Constitution is a commitment to substantive reasoning, to examining the underlying principles that inform laws themselves and judicial reaction to those laws. 61 The courts do not need to tell the executive how to implement policy. What is needed is for the courts to ensure that the founding values of the Constitution are entertained by the executive when forming and implementing the policy. By enquiring whether the values of non-discrimination, accountability, participation, responsiveness and openness are addressed, the courts can explore the substantive justice of the law or policy.
In ascribing to the deference of the courts to other branches of government, O'Regan J stated as follows:
In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a court is recognising the proper role of the executive within the Constitution. In doing so, a court should be careful not to attribute to itself superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of government.
This approach by the Justice creates the impression that the courts go to great lengths to defer to the other organs of state, thus subscribing to a minimalist approach of constitutional interpretation. This dictum appears to be more concerned with judicial restraint than with the construction of a coherent concept of deference that might serve as a guide to a court, which seeks to mediate between law and the implementation of legislative and executive politics.
He continues by citing from para 42 of the Bato Star Fishing case, where the court argues:
This does not mean however that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the goal, or which is not supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision. A court should not rubber stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker.
According to Davis, this illustrates an "absence of a coherent theory of review in a constitutional context". Justice O'Regan's judgment turns on the deference owed to the expertise of the department charged with the decision to allocate fishing quotas, and Justice Ncobo bowed to transformational prominence and the fact that "functionaries" should be given the scope to implement these objectives. 69 Davis is rightly critical of both judgments and states that it is bizarre that the full bench One judgment is, at best, committed to respect for the principle of separation of powers. The other judgment appears to nudge the legal community to accept that an interrogation of constitutional values rather than a conflation of a contested concept of institutional competence with the principle of separation of powers must be the key guideline for review of administrative decisions. But, as it is about to take the conclusive step, it falters into line with the judgment of O'Regan J. The coherent theory of review in the constitutional era appears as much an illusion as the respondent department's commitment to transformation! Davis proposes a culture of justification for judicial review that takes into account the democratic prerogative of the elected arms of government to fashion and implement public policy within the framework of the Constitution. This culture accepts that the role of judicial review is to foster a culture of democracy, and that the judiciary must commence from a standpoint that it operates within a governmental system that is based upon a doctrine of the separation of powers. 71 Davis suggests that judges have to interpret their own role in a constitutional democracy, not only about unlocking the big constitutional conundrums, but also about the manner in which they go about the business of the review of the administration. 72 He argues that:
If the model of government is based on the idea of participation by citizens in decisions which affect them, the right to express views about any decision which an administrative agency is about to take which may determine a right of a citizen needs to be robustly protected, as would the right to reasons for any such decision and the corollary thereto, the provision of all reasonable means to participate in the decisionmaking process. The principle of separation of powers should not be allowed to undermine these rights of participation; in other words, deference should usually not play a significant role in the formulation of the scope and content of these procedural rights.
Although Davis' Separation of powers requires that the Judiciary refrain from being unnecessarily prescriptive to both the Executive and Parliament on the kind of institutionally independent body required to stem the tide of corruption in this country. The constitutionally compliant policy choices they make must be respected, even if there are, in the opinion of the Judiciary, better options available.
The Chief Justice concludes:
Ours is to ensure that the constitutional requirements for a functional and efficient corruption-busting machinery have been met and nothing more or less. are not a closed-set of logically organised rules. A formalistic approach to constitutional interpretation proposes that the substantive justice of the law under constitutional scrutiny is irrelevant. Such an interpretation runs counter to the founding values of the Constitution.
The culture of deference that the Constitutional Court subscribes to increasingly looks like judicial restraint. 78 The American author Dworkin rejects judicial restraint because judicial review exists to protect minorities against the oppression of the majority and judges should not defer to the will of the legislature. Courts must instead interpret constitutional rights according to the demands of precedent and integrity. Dworkin is also sceptical about the seriousness with which the legislature takes its responsibility to interpret the Constitution faithfully and to act in accordance with that interpretation.
He distrusts elected officials, believing that they are likely, due to electoral pressure, to ignore the Constitution and to take the side of the majority against the minority. 79
Dworkin's view has relevance in the South African constitutional state for two reasons. provisions and values and must mean more than the right to be informed about decisions. This principle must be true to a concept of "public interest" which is defined by constitutional values. 85
The strength of the executive means that it increasingly displays an unwillingness to engage with the courts through judicial proceedings 86 by ignoring the process 87 or through questioning the final judgment. 88 In Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa Eastern Cape, 89 the Minister failed to adhere to a court order instructing the state to reopen a refugee reception office. The Court stated that it is a most dangerous thing for a litigant, particularly a State department and senior officials in its employ, to wilfully ignore an order of court. 90 The Court found that: 91
The cornerstone of democracy and the rule of law is the uncompromising duty and obligation upon all persons, more especially State departments, to obey and comply with court orders. There are processes in place for those who disagree with court orders. But they are not free to simply turn a blind eye to the order nor do they have any discretion to not obey the order.
The Court found that no democracy could survive if court orders can be shunned and trampled on as happened in this matter and that there is a likelihood of a future 83 Davis 2006 Acta Juridica 24. 84 The ANC's political character allows it to align with groupings to the left or right with centralists continuing to hold the balance of power in the organisation. The ANC's commitment to constitutionalism is fragile and depends on the perceived public perception of the benefits of the repetition of similar conduct on the part of the relevant authorities. 92 Lenta writes that the political majority enjoyed by the ANC may tempt the government to not always act in a way that furthers the common good, but rather in a way that prioritises the government's and its supporters' interests over considerations of justice. 93 It is imperative that judicial review is structured in such a manner that state action is kept within the bounds of the Constitution. Venter posits that the justification for constitutional review should rather be sought in the need for the qualification of blind popular majoritarianism with rational judicial argument. 94 The principle of deference is not an effective qualification of the concept of majoritarianism. In fact, the principle of deference subscribes to a majoritarian vision of democracy by countenancing a "superior role" for the legislature and executive in lieu of the courts.
Venter argues as follows: 95
Where the Court orders the state "to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations" and subjects the reasonableness of government conduct to evaluation, it can by definition not be a meek and inhibited role. 
Conclusion
The dominance of the executive over Parliament means that at all three levels of government there are few effective checks and balances on the abuse of power by the executive. The deployment policy of the ANC calls for the placement of cadres in key positions in government and the public sector with the aim of bringing these institutions under its control. 97
McLean states that this means that the traditional separation of powers between the three branches of government is effectively found only between the courts on the one hand and the executive and legislature on the other. In the absence of robust checks and balances elsewhere, courts should respond, not by adopting a deferential position, Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng addressing the Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa (Van Eeden 2015 https://litigator.co.za/hands-off-judiciary-warns-chief-justice).
manipulated, then we have to be vigilant. Without an independent judiciary, democracy is doomed.
It is submitted that such a change in direction could be achieved by discarding the out-dated principle of deference and subscribing to a policy of judicial review based on the founding values of the Constitution; openness of government, justification of decisions by those in power, and the right to participation by those affected by the decision. Judicial review based on a culture of justification will allow for decisions by organs of state to be justified by the decision-maker within the public discourse fashioned by the Constitution, thereby rendering the decision-maker accountable to the public he serves. 101
The culture of "justification" approach as proposed by Davis finds the correct balance for judicial review in both an objective interpretation of constitutional provisions and the values inherent in the Constitution and offers a workable concept for the doctrine of the separation of powers.
South Africa subscribes to a democratic style of government based on accountability, responsiveness and openness. 102 When executive and legislative action is tested through litigation against a culture of justification, it allows these values to be explored and realised. This will allow for the opportunity for systemic change to the South African constitutional landscape based on the principles and values of the Constitution.
The Constitution does not call on judges to be passive administrators of justice. in the circumstances in which the South African constitutional state currently operates, where multiparty democracy comes under pressure, non-majoritarian constitutional review is essential for the survival of constitutionalism. 103 As stated by Venter: "Strong and fearless judicial consistency is needed as a corrective to majoritarian arrogance rather than judicial echoes of government policy and ideology". 
